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2“The organizational causes of this accident are rooted in the Space 
Shuttle Program’s history and culture, including the original 
compromises that were required to gain approval for the Shuttle, 
subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, 
schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the Shuttle as 
operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed 
national vision for human space flight.  Cultural traits and 
organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to 
develop, including: reliance on past success as a substitute for 
sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why 
systems were not performing in accordance with requirements); 
organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of 
critical safety information and stifled professional differences of 
opinion; lack of integrated management across program elements; 
and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision 
making processes that operated outside the organization’s rules.”
CAIB
Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report
Executive Summary (excerpt)
Space Shuttle Program History and Culture
■ Original compromises
■ Resource constraints
■ Fluctuating priorities
■ Schedule pressure
■ Calling Shuttle Operational 
versus Developmental
■ Lack of a National Vision for 
Human Space Flight
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CAIB
Cultural Traits and Organizational Practices
■Reliance on past success
■Lack of testing to understand system 
performance
■Stifled professional differences of opinion that 
prevented communication
■Lack of integrated management across 
Program Elements
■Evolution of an Informal Chain of Command 
allowing for decision-making outside of the 
formal process
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CAIB
■ Challenger Accident Backdrop
– Temperature at launch:  36 degrees Fahrenheit 
– Launch postponed three times and scrubbed once from 
original planned date of January 22, 1986
– First teacher in space
– State of the Union address scheduled evening of launch
■ Columbia Accident Backdrop
– 16-day mission included 80+ science experiments
– Successful launch
• “Typical” foam insulation shedding from external tank 
showed up on launch footage 
– Mission going well on-orbit;  Mission 
Management Team elects not to meet daily
– Heading into a 3-day
Holiday weekend
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SETTING THE STAGE
Columbia Fast Facts
Launch Date:  January 16, 2003, 
10:39 a.m. EST
Accident: February 1, 2003, 9 a.m. 
EST - Columbia and crew lost 
during reentry over East Texas 16 
minutes prior to planned landing 
at KSC
Orbiter:  Columbia (OV-102) - 27th 
mission
Oldest Orbiter in the fleet (STS-1 in
April 1981)
STS-107:  113th Space Shuttle Flight
Challenger Fast Facts
Launch Date: January 28, 1986, 
11:38 a.m. EST
Accident: 73 seconds after launch
Orbiter:  Challenger (OV-099) - 10th 
mission
STS-51L:  25th Space Shuttle Flight
Leadership issues that contributed to each accident were very similar
“Based on NASAʼs history of ignoring external recommendations, or making 
improvements that atrophy with time, the Board has no confidence that the Space 
Shuttle can be safely operated for more than a few years based solely on renewed 
post-accident vigilance.” (Source:  CAIB Report, Vol. I, Aug. 2003, page. 13.)
Schedule vs Safety as a Priority
■ Challenger
NASA published a projection in 1985 calling for an annual rate of 24 flights per year by 
1990, which drove pressure to hold launch date in spite of weather conditions outside 
of Launch Limit Criteria
■ Columbia
Didn’t want to impact planned on-orbit mission objectives/science
experiments by adding requirements for tile inspection Extravehicular
Activity (EVA) or external imagery support
LEADERSHIP LESSONS
Normalization of Deviance
■ Challenger
– O-Ring Unexplained Anomalies (UA) from previous flights 
■ Columbia
– Foam shedding on other missions deemed “typical”
Suppressing vs Encouraging Dissent
■ Challenger
Solid Rocket Booster manufacturer’s Senior Vice President at home plant 
overruled Launch Site Chief Engineer and signed Certificate of Flight 
Readiness (CoFR)
■ Columbia
Numerous experienced Contractor and NASA personnel expressed 
concerns with foam shedding
LEADERSHIP LESSONS
Technical Competence vs Bureaucratic Process
Bureaucratic Decision Processes
■ Challenger
– Decision to launch was flawed.  Decision-makers did not take into full account: 
• Recent history of problems with O-rings 
• Contractor advising against launch with propellant bulk temperatures below 
53 degrees Fahrenheit
• Continuing opposition of engineers after management reversed its position 
■ Columbia
– A culture of bureaucratic accountability emphasized chain of
command, procedure, following the rules, and going by the book. 
– While rules and procedures were essential for coordination, they
had an unintended but negative effect 
– Allegiance to hierarchy and procedure had replaced deference to
engineersʼ technical expertise
LEADERSHIP LESSONS
LEADERSHIP LESSONS
Enduring Lessons
■Speak up
■Dissention has tremendous value
■Question conventional wisdom
■Engineering is done with numbers
